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CHAPTER I 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PEOPLE AND LITERARY CHARACTERS 
Most often we think of characters in books as 
though they were people. It's easy to do. Don't we 
laugh at Falstaff and cry for Katrina Ivanovna? Don't 
we feel we know them well, often better than we feel we 
know our friends? But this feeling we have that charac-
ters are people cannot be transferred to criticism. For 
instance, if I decide that Hamlet is person enough to be 
like my brother, I have not communicated anything about 
the Hamlet who is the character in the play Hamlet. I 
would not want to say: "I read Hamlet; it is about my 
brother;" but I might say: "I read Hamlet; and Hamlet is 
like my brother." I might say this, but it is not 
criticism, because it doesn't communicate critically any-
thing about the character Hamlet. If I were to go 
another step and say that Hamlet is like my brother in 
that Hamlet puns a lot and so does my brother, and then 
drop out the part about the brother to say, "Hamlet puns 
a lot," I move into criticism. The part about Hamlet 
being person enough to be like my brother is irrelevant 
to criticism, but it was useful in the process of 
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arriving at criticism. The impulse that makes us 
connect characters in books with various kinds of 
people in our lives should not be confused with criti-
cism about character. The words on the page are not 
people; those words on the page are characters, and they 
resemble people no more than the alphabetical characters 
£ 1 ~' and ~ "resemble" a familiar pet. 
George Wright's theory of character in The Poet and 
the Poem seems to work well when discussing character. He 
suggests that "characters in literature have no extension 
beyond the limits of the work in which they appear; they 
have, on the other hand, a kind of extendibility, a sym-
bolic dimension that the matter-of-fact persons of our 
acquaintance do not have." 1 If the first part of this is 
accepted, it might be possible to say that a character is 
a collection of words divided into two parts: the part 
that can be called the body collection (actions, so-
called, fit into this collection); and the part that can 
be called the mind collection (thoughts, so-called, fit 
here). These collections of words, when read and formed 
into a pattern by the reader, create an image in the 
reader's mind. But it is a little misleading to suggest 
that collections of words must be read in order to 
create an image. Whenever even one character word is 
read, an image is created. "Image," here, does not 
always mean "picture." If we are honest and look at 
the words that delimit character, we find that there 
are not enough words on the page to make a picture in 
our minds. But, as Arnold Bennett has noticed, "the 
honest written word possesses a mysterious and intimid-
ating power. This power has to do with the sense of 
sight. You see something. You do not see your action 
or your thought as it might be on the cinema screen --
happily! -- but you do see something in regard to the 
matter." 2 This "something" might be called an image, 
which Ezra Pound has defined as "an intellectual and 
emotional complex in an instant of time."3 
This image can be extended into verbal life, can be 
extended, that is, not to people, but to what we are 
willing to say about people. Of the various collections 
of words that are in a book, syntactical characters are 
those collections of words that can be distinguished 
from other groups of words in perhaps two ways: the 
first is that characters are groups of words we are 
willing to say are people, or are willing, at least, to 
say are like people once we have formed an image; the 
second distinction is that characters couldn't possibly 
refer to anyone outside the book. 
Of course, as William Gass has noted in "The Concept 
of Character in Fiction," "anything, indeed, which serves 
as a fixed point, like a stone in a stream or that soap in 
Bloom's pocket, functions as a character," 4 but in this 
3 
paper only those fixed points around which the language 
of a work flows, those fixed points a reader would 
identify with "people" will be considered characters. 
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Much criticism of character is based on some form of 
this first assumption about character, the assumption that 
characters are words we would identify with people. But, 
unfortunately, the criticism sometimes confuses this 
identification with what a character is. Since there is 
a lot of criticism based on this assumption, it might be 
helpful when surveying it to classify it according to 
M. H. Abrams' schema for classifying general criticism. 
Criticism of character can fit into Abrams' four cate-
gories -- the mimetic, which is the relationship between 
the work of art and life; the expressive, which is the 
relationship between the work and the artist; the pragma-
tic, which is the relationship between the work and the 
audience; and the objective, which is the work itself. 5 
In the criticism of character, the mimetic does not remain 
a category in itself; it divides into two parts and then 
falls into either the expressive or the pragmatic cate-
gories. 
If it can be assumed that a character is a collection 
of words and the image that results from reading those 
words, we can say that "character" differs from a person 
in that a character is not expected to appear physically 
from behind this curtain of words; a character is not the 
object of perception that a person can be. Yet mimetic 
criticism, like that of E. M. Forster, assumes that 
characters are people in books who were once people in 
life. What, then, is the relationship between people 
in a novel and people in an historical tract? Forster 
says that "there is bound to be a difference" between the 
two: 
If a character in a novel is like Queen 
Victoria -- not rather like but exactly like --
then it actually is Queen Victoria, and the 
novel, or all of it that the character touches, 
becomes a memoir. A memoir is history, it is 
based on evidence. A novel is based on evidence 
+ or - x, the unknown quantity being the tempera-
ment of the novelist, and the unknown quantity 
always modifies the effect of the 6 evidence, and 
sometimes transforms it entirely. 
Forster seems to get carried away when he suggests that 
the character "actually is Queen Victoria," because if 
we were to accept that, words would be life, or, at 
least, we'd be constantly giving birth, like Zeus, to 
Anthenas out of our minds. Surely he doesn't mean this. 
He means instead something like: there was a real Queen 
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Victoria who was observed, and certain observations, among 
a multitude of possible ones, and only those certain 
observations, were written down. And so we know we have 
picked up a book of memoirs. 
What is Forster's corresponding assumption about 
novels? He assumes that there was a real Elizabeth Bennett, 
say, who existed and was observed prior to the creation of 
Middlemarch, and these felt observations ("temperament 
of the artist") were written down, felt observations 
which alter the affect of the original Elizabeth Bennett 
almost, often, to the point of completely changing the 
observations, and these, which we might call "observa-
tions," are written down. If we assume that there was a 
real Elizabeth Bennett, Middlemarch becomes not a record 
6 
of the real Elizabeth Bennett, for that would make 
Middlemarch a memoir, but a record of the emotions of the 
novelist, or, as Castelvetro says, "the strife of the poet." 
This is a seemingly mimetic view of the novel that is 
actually an expressive view, a romantic view. 
Critically, we don't know very much about character 
if we use Forster's thinking. Does it inform the character 
Hamlet to say that Hamlet is how Shakespeare felt about 
some real Hamlet? Not any more than discovering Hamlet 
is like one's brother helped us critically. 
didn't take his criticism quite far enough. 
Forster 
He begins 
with the assumption that characters are people in books 
and ends his discussion on a point that doesn't inform 
us about character; it informs us about novelists. 
It would seem that if an expressive view isn't 
critically useful, an objective view might be, because an 
objective view concentrates on the book itself, on the 
book we read. It is on the objective level that character 
is a collection of words. Perhaps an analysis of a passage 
from Middlemarch would be useful here: 
Caleb pushed his spectacles upward, listened, 
looked into his f1vorite's clear young eyes, 
and believed him. 
Caleb is a grammatical character in a book, a group of 
words grammatically bound to a proper name. Caleb is 
"pushed," "his spectacles," "listened, looked," 
"believed," and "Caleb." The grammatical character 
"Caleb" is not yet someone who wears glasses. As the 
image is formed from these words, the notion of "live 
person" is added to them, because "Caleb" is the sort 
of name a person would have, and because the verbs and 
nouns that cluster around "Caleb" are the kinds of verbs 
and nouns that would be associated with a live person. 
And so caleb becomes "someone" who wears glasses. So 
the associations go on, but at the simple level of 
words on the page, there is no person. 
William Gass assumes that this simple level, words 
on a page, is the only "reality" of character. In Gass's 
schema, "Caleb" would be "(1) a noise, (2) a proper name, 
(3) a complex system of ideas, (4) a controlling concep-
tion, (5) an instrument of verbal organization, (6) a 
pretended mode of referring, and (7) a source of verbal 
8 
energy." 
Of course, this is not the alive-seeming Caleb 
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Garth we talk about when we discuss Middlemarch, because 
we don't have the image yet; but, for us as readers, Caleb 
Garth begins as words in a book. He begins as words, and 
these words, which become patterned, or are realized to be 
"a complex system of ideas," become almost simultaneously 
a mental image. We need this image to account for our 
sense that Caleb lives. Although Gass can account for 
part of a reader's experience with character, his criti-
cism falls short of a full sense of that experience 
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because he calls character "a pretended mode of referring," 
instead of noting that character, as words on a page, 
give rise to an image, an image that we can critically 
refer to. 
Pragmatic criticism, because it is concerned with the 
relationship between the work of art and an audience, 
would seem a likely place to find the missing part of our 
experience with character, but, curiously, pragmatic criti-
cism seems to be another form of mimetic criticism that 
fails to give us a full sense of character. Sir Philip 
Sidney, one of the teach-and-delight critics, a pragmatic 
critic therefore, says that poetry is made "tc imitate, 
and imitate both to delight and teach, and delight to move 
men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight 
they would flie as from a stranger ... : 9 Even though Sidney 
means the poet to imitate not people but "notable images 
of virtues, vices, or what els," 10 characters still become 
speaking pictures, pictures not of men, but of vices: 
"wisdom and temperance in Ulysses and Diomedes, valure 
in Achilles, friendship in Nisus and Eurialus." 11 The 
reader is to be delighted by the pictures of embodied 
virtues and vices that appear in the book. Sidney under-
stands that there are images associated with reading, but 
he puts the images in the wrong place. The role of the 
reader is more active than Sidney supposes. The reader 
does not read an already-put-together picture book; 
the reader reads words, and if there are images, the 
reader must make them from those words. 
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It seems, then, that the question of the relationship 
between characters in a book and people in life is still an 
open question critically. Further, it seems that any 
answer to the question must consider the three experiences 
we have with character, the two experiences of the words on 
the page and the experience of those words somehow coming 
alive. 
In this connection Wright's observation about charac-
ter is particularly useful, and this paper owes much of its 
thought and organization to the implications of that obser-
vation. The second chapter of.this paper will be based 
mainly on Wright's contention that "characters in literature 
have no extension beyond the limits of the work in which 
they appear." The second chapter, then is concerned mainly 
with objective criticism that finds that on the simple level 
of words in a book, there are two of the three parts of 
our experience with character. The first part is the 
syntactical character, which is the occurrence on the 
printed page of character words, character words as they 
appearone after another as the book is read. The second 
part is the spatial character, the recognition by the 
reader that the name we have seen several times, with 
its accompanying noun and verb clusters, is about the 
same thingi spatial character is what Gass might be call-
ing an "instrument of verbal organization." The spatial 
character relies at least partially on the image for its 
organization. 
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Also in the second chapter, between objective criti-
cism and Wright's "symbolic dimension," is the image, the 
"emotional and intellectual complex," which is the "some-
thing" we get in our minds at the first sight of a 
character word and which moves and changes with each 
additional character word as the reader patterns the syn-
tactical character. The image is fluid, because it depends 
both on the words read in the past and on the words that 
are being read, but it is in no sense symbolic of the words 
being read, nor is it a translation into a picture of what 
is being read. It is a "something" that the grammatical 
character gives rise to. In the second chapter, then, 
character is defined as these three elements -- syntactical 
character, spatial character, and image. 
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The third chapter of this paper will discuss Wright's 
notion that characters in literature "have ... a kind of 
extendability, a symbolic dimension that the matter-of-
fact persons of our acquaintance do not have." The third 
chapter assumes that there is no relationship between 
people and characters in a book; rather, the relationship 
is between the grammatical character, the image, and what 
a reader is willing to say about people. 
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. CHAPTER II 
THREE ELEMENTS OF CHARACTER 
Character in prose and in poetry is a process that 
includes three separate elements, and, as a critical term, 
"character" means all three: (1) the words that delimit 
character in the order in which they occur on the printed 
page; (2) these printed words organized in the reader's mind 
to be a verbal pattern on the syntactical level; (3) a men-
tal image that results from reading the printed words. The 
image is not memorized printed words, nor is it just a 
picture. 
The first two elements, as I state in the first chap-
ter, are suggested by Wright's claim that "characters in 
literature have no extension beyond the work in which they 
appear," and they refer as well to Northrop Frye's defini-
tion of the literal level of literature: "the literal 
basis of meaning ... can only be its letters, its inner 
structure of interlocking motifs." 1 Frye's "meaning of its 
letters" corresponds to the first element, "the words of 
character as they appear on the prirted page." This first 
element will be called syntactical character. The "inner 
structure of interlocking motifs," mentioned by Frye as 
part of his definition of "literal," corresponds to the 
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second element, the printed words of character ordered 
into a pattern. This second element will be called the 
spatial character. These two phaseA of character together 
will be called the grammatical character. 
The third element, the image, is extraliteral, mean-
ing not that character comes mysteriously from the air, nor 
that character resides in the world, but that the image 
comes mysteriously from the printed words; it is not, how-
ever like the words it comes from, nor is it the words 
themselves. Images haunt our minds as the thing which the 
grammatical character gives rise to. 2 
On the syntactic level, one of the most obvious facts 
about character is the name, a name that is a no~ense 
word. There will not be strong support for calling names 
like "Artegall," "Dorothea Brooke," or "Odysseus" nonsense 
words, but on the syntactic level they are, because all that 
can be said about them, as William Gass has said, is that 
they are either noises or proper names. 
A discussion of a passage from The Faerie Queene might 
help us here. 
Dread Soverayne Goddesse, that doest highest sit 
In seate of judgement in th' Almighties stead, 
And with magnificke might and wondrous wit 
Doest to thy people righteous doome aread, 
That furthest Nations filles with awful dread, 
Pardon the boldnesse of thy basest thrall, 
That dare discourse of so divine a read 
As they great justice, praysed over-all, 3 The instrument whereof loe! here they Artegall. 
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Here "Artegall" is simply a noise, a proper name, if we are 
reading on the level of the syntactic character. We are not 
concerned with the truth of the word, its reference to the 
world. Spenser did not need an Artegall to write "Artegall" 
any more than Lewis Carroll needed a vorpal sword in order 
to write "vorpal sword." Nor do we, as we read, need a real 
Artegall or a real vorpal sword in order to understand these 
words. Syntax itself will allow us to create words that 
have only literal meaning, which means that the "words can-
not be separated and attached to sign-values: all possible 
sign values of a word are absorbed into a complexity of 
verbal relationships."4 In this understanding of the liter-
al level of the poem, Frye is talking about the meaning of 
a whole poem, so the notion of literal meaning he uses might 
be applied to only some words of a poem, say, to the names 
and noun and verb phrases that are syntactic character. 
"Soverayne Goddesse," for instance, is the name of a charac-
ter, a name that has possible sign value, but the sign values 
have been absorbed into the poem. There is only one word in 
the passage from The Faerie Queene that is a nonsense word, 
a word that has no possible sign value. That word is "Arte-
gall." On the literal level, then, Artegall is where the 
name is. 
It is from a realization like this that William Gass 
has said that "words are opaque, as opaque as my garden 
gloves and trowel, objects which, nevertheless, may vividly 
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remind me of spring, earth, and roses."5 Gass, here, is 
talking about what can be called literal meaning. But such 
a view as his seems to take a purely syntactic analysis 
too far to be true of our perception of character. 
Although literally a character is only where the name and 
the nouns and verbs of it are, we don't want to say that 
these words are opaque, because we have yet to get an image 
from them. To continue Gass•s metaphor, if we say these 
words are opaque to us as readers, we have also said that 
the trowel is opaque to us when we have gardening to do. 
And, of course, we don't want to say that because just as 
the trowel is a tool for gardening, so are words tools for 
images. The words of character on the literal level are 
opaque to Gass because character words are opaque to the 
world. But syntactical character is not opaque to us as 
readers the way vorpal sword is. 
It is the realization that these words are not 
opaque to us as readers that creates the need critically 
for both the spatial character and the image. The spatial 
character, as a pattern of character words, is what defines 
syntactical character as a character for us rather than as 
simply unassociated words. The image is the mental thing 
that the grammatical character gives rise to; the image is, 
therefore, on the mental side of the grammatical character. 
In the passage from The Faerie Queene, for example, "Arte-
gall" means spatially "the instrument of thy justice." 
Syntactically, the word ''Artegall" means "Arthur's equal," 
and because "Artegall" is capitalized, we know that it is 
a proper name. But these grammatical and etymological 
meanings are not always what we mean critically when we 
discuss Artegall. There is a spatial meaning that seems 
closer to our notions of character than does "Arthur's 
equal." What we would probably say critically is that 
"Arthur's equal" is the meaning of a character's name; 
we would not finally say that the name or its meaning is 
the character, but syntactically it is. 
I know that a while back I said that syntactically, 
the words of character are nonsense. This meant that 
character words do not refer to the world; it also meant 
that syntactical character does not make sense as charac-
ter until we put it all together, until we create spatial 
character. A regular reading of syntax was all that was 
necessary for us to understand that "Artegall" means not 
only "Arthur's equal," but that it means "instrument of 
thy justice" as well. With the addition, then, of the 
notion of spatial character, "Artegall" not only gets 
character meaning, but the words "instrument of thy jus-
tice," words which might have possible sign value,get 
subsumed into the literal level of the text, and, for the 
first time, critically, we have grammatical character, 
our first sense of full character. 
17 
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Not all verbal patterns that we would call character 
center themselves on names, but the same process is always 
involved. Shakespeare's sonnets seem a likely place to 
find grammatical characters without names: 
My Mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun, 
Coral is far more red than her lips' red. 
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun, 
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head. 
I have seen roses damasked, red and white, 
But no such roses see I in her cheeks. 
And in some perfumes is there more delight 
Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks. 
I love to hear her speak, yet well I know 
That music hath a far more pleasing sound. 
I grant I never saw a goddess go, 
My mistress, when she walks, treads on the ground. 
And yet, by heaven, I think my love ag rare 
As any she belied with false compare. 
Syntactically, there are two characters here, "Mistress' 
eyes are nothing like the sun,/Coral is far more red 
than her lips' red./If snows be white," etc., which, when 
they are sorted out syntactically, become the two 
characters "Mistress" and "I." The grammatical character 
"mistress" means 7 spatially "eyes are nothing like the 
sun," "Coral is far more red than her lips' red," "her 
breasts are dun," "black wires grow on her head," "her 
cheeks," "And in some perfumes is there more delight/Than 
in the breath that from my mistress reeks," "her speak," 
"mistress," "she walks, treads on the ground," "love as 
rare/As any she belied with false compare." The grammati-
cal character "I" means "my," "I have seen," "see I," 
"my," "I love to hear," "well I know/That music hath a 
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more pleasing sound," "I grant I never saw," "my," 
"I think." 
It is customary to think that "I" means William 
Shakespeare. Perhaps, but it doesn't add very much 
critically to think that after each "I" there is a 
parenthetical William Shakespeare. Syntactically, "I" 
is simply a first person pronoun that governs the choice 
of the verb; it also means that the speaker of a sentence 
and the doer of it are the same. But, of course, this 
sense of "I" seems cold. 
Wright speaks well to our sense that "I" is somehow 
alive and sacred. 
There are always two levels of speech in a work 
of literature -- that on which the characters 
speak to each other, to themselves, to an implied 
audience, or to God, and that on which the writer 
speaks to us. In the lyric poem more than in any 
other genre these levels tend to become confused. 
We can sense rather easily the presence of the two 
levels in a fairly formal lyric, say a love sonnet. 
On the surface we can read the following personae: 
1st person: singer of love song 
2nd person: singer's mistress 
3rd person: singer's love for mistress. 8 
The first two persons are the "I" and the "mistress" of 
Shakespeare's sonnet. The third person is not "in" 
the words of the poem; it is associated with the image as 
can be seen in Wrights's second level of speech: 
1st person: 
2nd person: 
3rd person: 
composer of song 
we as readers or hearers 
human passion, one aspect of the 
human world.9 
This third person is clearly different from the 2nd 
person because human passion is larger than any one per-
son's private notion of it, just as the poet is larger 
than any "I" of a poem. Wright says that when a poet 
tries to give us his world view, a view requiring for 
its full formulation those "particular events, situations, 
emotions, and tones," he could never express it "by an 
'I' within the poem. The poet's point of view is always 
larger than any 'I' for the 'I,' like the other surface 
materials of the poem, is only a conventional element." 
It is possible, then, to consider the 'I' of a poem 
as separate from the writer of the poem. Of course, 
Wright's contention that the poet's point of view is 
always larger than any 'I' of the poem, falls out of our 
view of this paper since it deals with the relationship 
between artist and work, and this paper deals with the 
20 
relationship between work and audience. But it is possible 
to replace Wright's first person with the syntactical 
aspects of the poem -- its rhyme, its rhythm, its sounds, 
and so on. We could then say that the 'I' of any poem, 
or maybe any character of a poem, is only one part of a 
poem; the poem is always larger than any character. or, 
to play on Aristotle, you can always have a poem without a 
character, but you cannot have a character without a poem. 
21 
Our sense that "I" is somehow alive and sacred 
comes, then, from the third person, "human passion, one 
aspect of the human world," and the sense of human 
passion resides in the second person, the readers or 
hearers. But this anticipates the third chapter and 
so will wait until then. 
The "I," of Sonnet 130 can be spoken of as separate 
from William Shakespeare and can be said to take its 
meaning as a character, rather than as a word, from the 
spatial character, so that as a spatial character "I" 
both is and means "My," "I have seen," and all those other 
phrases that were listed before. 
Throughout this discussion of grammatical character, 
phrases have been used that imply the presence of the 
image. When I said that the "I" of Sonnet 130 gets its 
meaning from syntax, the grammatical character "I" was 
certainly being pointed at, but so was the image. Perhaps 
critically the image can best be seen when it replaces 
the grammatical character in criticism. Percy Lubbock, 
in a brilliant discussion of why Emma Bovary is in 
Madame Bovary, replaces the grammatical character with 
its image: 
Here is the clue, it seems, to his treatment 
of the theme. It is pictorial, and its object 
is to make Emma's existence as intelligible and 
visible as may be. We who read the book are to 
share her sense of life ... ~he fact of Emma is 
taken with entire seriousness of course; she 
is there to be studied and explored, and no means 
of understanding her point of view will be 
neglected.lO 
~en Lubbock says "the fact of Emma," and not "the fact 
of 'Emma'," and when he talks about the visible sense of 
the book, he is replacing grammatical character with the 
image. 
When we say that Red Crosse Knight killed the dragon 
Error instead of quoting the passage, we are usually 
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referring to the image and not to the grammatical character 
"Red Crosse Knight." What is the image? 
Unfortunately, a critic cannot point to the images 
and say, "there they are"; one must simply appeal to one's 
experience. I've said before that the image could best be 
understood as "an intellectual and emotional complex 
presented in an instant of time," and that the image is 
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not the words themselves; it is a sort of Gestalt. 
Before discussing the obvious complication that we 
often understand "image" only as though it translates 
"picture," we might examine how the grammatical character 
is perceived by the reader; for, it is in the perception 
of the grammatical character that the image first arises. 
In order to facilitate the later discussion of mental 
pictures, it may be helpful to look at Sonnet 130 again, 
since it would be difficult to get a picture of either of 
the two characters in that poem. 
It was noticed before that there are two grammatical 
characters in Sonnet 130, the "I" and the "mistress," and 
all the phrases that cluster around either word. "Syntacti-
cal character" is the phrases as they occur in the order in 
which we read them. Spatial character is these phrases 
patterned. If we look again at the first six lines of 
the sonnet, we can see that there are at least two ways to 
explain how the reader patterns the syntactical character. 
My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun, 
Coral is far more red than her lips' red. 
If snow be white, why then her breasts are dun, 
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on her head. 
I have seen roses damasked, red and white, 
But no such roses see I in her cheeks. 
By the time we have read "My Mistress'" we have two syntac-
tical characters. Then, at the end of the second line, 
we read "her lips' red," and we link together "Mistress'" 
and "her lips," thereby creating the beginning of a gram-
matical character centered around "Mistress'." There are 
at least two ways of talking about this linki "her" refers 
syntactically to "Mistress'," and we can say that there is 
a link by image; we recognize, probably because of the 
grammatical link, that "Mistress'" and "her" are about the 
same thing. This "thing" is the image. We began creating 
the image at the same time that we read the word "Mis-
tress'." There might be a confusion here. I am not 
talking about understanding the words, for, as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein has remarked, "it is no more essential to 
23 
24 
the understanding of a proposition that one should imagine 
anything in connection with it, than that one should make 
a sketch fro~ it~ 12 We understand the syntactical characters 
"Mistress'" and "I," and we understand these words as they 
take on literal meanings from spatial character; we don't 
need the image, in the sense of a picture, an analogy or 
a "something" in order to understand. 
The image exists, however, and is used in criticism. 
In this sense Wittgenstein is again useful. 
Instead of "imaginability" one can also say 
here: representability by a particular 
method of representation. And such a repre-
sentation may indeed safely point a way to 
further use of a sentence. On the other 
hand a picture may obtrude itself upon us 
and be of no use at all.l3 
The clause here that is particularly useful is "And such 
a representation may indeed safely point a way to further 
use of a sentence." We use our images in criticism, and 
criticism is a further use of a passage. Perhaps if we 
look at a passage from Madame Bovary and then look again at 
Lubbock's discussion of Emma, we can see that the image is 
not necessarily a picture, but that the image is used 
critically. 
Once she was standing there on a day of thaw, 
when the bark of the trees in the farmyard was 
oozing sap and the snow was melting on the roofs. 
She went inside for her parasol, and opened it. 
The parasol was of rosy iridescent silk, and the 
sun pouring through it painted the white skin of 
her face with flickering patches of light. 
Beneath it she smiled at the springlike warmth; 
and drops of water could be heard falling one by 
one on the taut moire.l4 
If this passage gives rise to a picture in our minds, 
presumably we see a woman, because of "she," with a white-
skinned face and a smile, with no body, holding, without 
hands, a rosy-red parasol. William Gass, when he is dis-
cussing Mr. Cashmore in The Awkward Age, suggests that 
as "a set of sensations Mr. Cashmore is simply impossible~ 
as an idea he is admirably pungent and precise."l5 The 
same thing can be said of Emma Bovary~ as a grammatical 
character she is "mostly empty canvas," but as an image 
she is a wonderful idea. 
When Lubbock said "the fact of Emma," he wasn't 
talking about the grammatical character nor was he really 
talking about a picture in our minds. Why, then, does it 
make so much sense when he says "it is pictorial, and its 
object is to make Emma's existence as intelligible and 
visible as may be"? What is he talking about? I think 
he's talking about the idea, the thing we "see" with 
respe~t to character, not exactly the "seeing" in which we 
understand what something means, the sense with which we 
"see what it means," but in the visual sense, that Frye 
calls "doodle." 
The two elements of subconscious association which 
form the basis for lyrical melos and opsis, 
respectively, have never been given names. We may 
name them if the terms are thought dignified 
enough, babble and doodle.l6 
"Doodle" is opsis, the visual aspect of art~ it is imagism, 
of which Frye says: 
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There are thousands of lyrics so intently focused 
on visual imagery that they are, as we may say, 
set to pictures. In the emblem an actual picture 
appears, and the poet-painter Blake ... engraved 
lyrics in the emblem tradition ... The movement 
called imagism made a great deal of the pictorial 
element in the lyric.l7 
Just on the level of style alone, it is easy to see 
the critical difference between using the grammatical 
person and using the image. As a group of words, Emma 
Bovary is a point of view; as an image it is possible for 
her to have a point of view. And it is one step from 
Emma's having a point of view to our being able to say that 
Emma becomes a kind of person. At the beginning of the 
book, when she was just the words "standing there on a day 
of thaw" and "she smiled at the springlike warmth," we 
could not say that Emma was anything except several words, 
a point of view. 
Gass has a warning about images, a warning that 
should be noted: "We tend to pay attention to our picture, 
and lose sight of the meaning. The novelist's words are 
not notes which he is begging the reader to play, as if 
his novel needed something more to be done to it in order 
1 . . "16 to eap 1nto ex1stence. I think the novel does have 
more done to it than to be simply understood, as Gass is 
suggesting, but he is right that readers must avoid 
impressionistic criticism. We must be careful that we 
don't image a purple cow from Faulkner's "The Old People;" 
the words won't support such an image. 
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Now this criticism has come full circle. The 
grammatical character must again be referred to, even if 
we have arrived at an image. The images are a kind of 
representation that are used to talk about grammatical 
character. Returning to the grammatical character, 
realizing that grammatical character is words, prevents 
such critical comments as Forster's that characters are 
people in books and Sidney's that characters are pictures 
of virtues and vices. 
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CHAPTER III 
CHARACTERS IN BOOKS AND PEOPLE IN LIFE 
Most often we think of characters in books as though 
they were people in life. At the beginning of the first 
chapter, I suggested that this is easy to do. But now 
that it might be possible to isolate three phases of 
character, it might also be difficult to think of characters 
in books as though they were people. If "characters in 
books" means solely grammatical character, means, in other 
words, a group of words on a page, there can be no resem-
blance between characters in books and people in life. 
But, we keep thinking, there is some kind of resemblance. 
Perhaps the relationship is that characters in books, if 
they are said to resemble anything, resemble what the reader 
is willing to say about life. 
This last, "what people are willing to say about 
life," is implicit in most discussions of character. 
Aristotle, when he discusses the universal, is discussing 
what readers would be willing to say about life; he is not 
discussing life. 
For poetry tells us rather the universals, 
history the particulars. 'Universal' means 
what kind of thing a certain kind of person 
will say or do in accordance with probability 
or necessity, which is what poetic composition 
aims at, tacking on names afterward; while 
'particular' is what Alcibiades did or had done 
to him.l 
The phrase "a certain kind of person" implies speech; it 
implies speech because it implied selection. I think 
Aristotle is pointing at a situation like this: there is 
a student named "Hamlet, Prince of Denmark" who is 
mourning the death of his father; he is presented with a 
ghost that says his father was murdered by his uncle; the 
student could, among other things, ignore the ghost, take 
his uncle to the courts, become very confused, take 
revenge, laugh as at a joke. This last might not seem 
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to many of us a possible reaction, because most of us would 
not want to say that a student would think the murder of 
his father a laughing matter. If Hamlet, the Prince of 
Denmark, chose revenge, he would become the Hamlet of 
Shakespeare's play. In order to see these possibilities, 
and in order to see that any particular action is one of 
several possible actions, the reader has to say something 
about life. 
Similarly, it was noted in the second chapter that 
our sense that "I" is somehow alive and sacred comes from 
"human passion, one aspect of the human world." This 
means not that "I" means a real passion, but that we 
transfer our personal use of "I," the use that I use "I" 
when I refez to myself, and myself is somehow more alive 
and more sacred than themselves. But it is the transference 
of our individual uses of the word "I" and not the "I" of 
any poem, that makes the first person of a poem so special 
and alive. 
It seems that there are four possible comparisons 
between grammatical characters and what a reader would say 
about people in life: (1} Hamlet is the character who is 
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like my brother; (2) Hamlet is the character who is an 
example of some set of generalizations about life; (3) Ham-
let is a type of person -- a melancholic, a Dane, a man; 
(4) Hamlet is both an individual and some sort of universal, 
which is close to, but not quite the same as, Hamlet is a 
concept embodied. This last category is the "concrete 
universal," which is the old theory that a thing is simul-
taneously individual and general. 2 
The first possibility, that Hamlet is like my brother, 
is often found in biographical criticism, student literary 
papers, and memoirs. It's quite relaxing criticism and 
is often felt to be very enlightening about both Hamlet and 
the brother. But, of course, this is not criticism; it is 
impressionism. 
The second possibility, that a character is an example 
of some set of generalizations about people in life, ethical, 
or political generalizations, has its two kinds of expressions. 
One kind is expressed in novels like Middlemarch and the 
other kind is expressed in criticism like that of W.K. Wim-
satt in The Verbal Icon. There is, in George Eliot's 
Middlemarch, a grammatical character that is an example of 
a grammatical generalization. 
We are all of us born in moral stupidity, 
taking the world as an udder to feed our 
supreme selves; Dorothea had early begun to 
emerge from that stupidity, but yet it had 
been easier to her to imagine how she would 
devote herself to Mr. Causabon and be wise 
and strong in his strength and wisdom, than 
to conceive with that distinctness which is 
no longer reflection but feeling -- an idea 
wrought back to the directness of sense, 
like the solidity of objects -- that he had 
an equivalent centre of self, whence the 
lights and shadows must always fall with a 
certain difference.3 
There are three generalizations in this passage from 
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Middlemarch: (1) "We are all of us born in moral stupidity, 
taking the world as an udder to feed our supreme selves;" 
(2) "to conceive with that distinctness which is no longer 
reflection but feeling -- an idea wrought back to the 
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects;" (3) "an 
equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows 
must always fall with a certain difference." Enmeshed in 
these generalizations, generalizations that take up 63 of 
the 105 words in the paragraph, are "Dorothea" and 
"Mr. causabon." "Dorothea" is early linked with the first 
generalization; she had "early begun to emerge from that 
stupidity," "that stupidity" referring to "moral stupidity" 
from the first part of the sentence. Notice, too, that this 
paragraph is one sentence. 
W. K. Wimsatt would call this kind of grammatical 
character a "concrete illustration." 
The fact is that all concrete illustration has 
about it something of the irrelevant. An 
apple falling from a tree illustrates gravity, 
but apple and tree are irrelevant to the pure 
theory of gravity. It may be that what 
happens in a poem is that the apple and the 4 tree are somehow more than usually relevant. 
"Dorothea," as a grammatical person, because Mr. Causabon 
is subordinate to her, is the group of words from 
"Dorothea" to "feeling" and from "that" to "difference." 
Most of these words are "moral" words, words that echo 
back spatially and antithetically to "We are all of us born 
in moral stupidity," etc. "Dorothea," "Mr. Causabon," 
"her," "she," "his," and "he," then, are syntactically 
linked with the set of moral words, making a grammatical 
character who is "born in moral stupidity" and is working 
her way to moral feeling, and who is, because of the 
tight linking, a relevant concrete illustration. 
Hamlet as a type of human being, the third kind of 
relationship, is linked critically with the Theophrastan 
Character sketch, of which Benjamin Boyce has said: "Theo-
retically speaking, the Character exists in order to typify 
a group; the portrait, to separate a man from the group." 5 
This statement is an example of one kind of type criticism, 
where the critic, looking at several works in a genre, has 
decided what kind of relationship that genre has to real 
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groups of people; in fact, the definition of the "Overburian 
Character" in Hollander and Kermode's The Literature of 
England involves this kind of criticism: 
An 'Overburian character' existed in order to 
represent the deft, tight, single, long 
paragraph of characterization of a type of 
actual person, rather than a virtue or vice 
embodied.6 
It would seem that there is a difference between the genre 
and its relationship to life. To demonstrate this I would 
like to look at one of the Overburian characters. 
An Amorist 
Is a man blasted or planet-strooken, and is the 
dog that leads blind Cupid; when he is the best 
his fashion exceeds the worth of his weight. He 
is never without verses and musk confects, and 
sighs to the hazard of his buttons. His eyes 
are all white, either to wear the livery of his 
mistress' complexion or to keep Cupid from 
hitting the black. He fights with passion and 
loseth much of his blood by his weapons; dreams, 
thence his paleness. His arms are carelessly 
used, as if their best use was nothing but 
embracements. He is untrussed, unbuttoned, and 
ungartered, not out of carelessness, but care; 
his farthest end being but going to bed. Some-
times he wraps his petition in neatness, but he 
goeth not alone; for then he makes some other 
quality moralize his affection, and his trimness 
is the grace of that grace. Her favour lifts 
him up as the sun moisture; when he disfavours, 
unable to hold that happiness, it falls down in 
tears. His fingers are his orators, and he 
expresseth much of himself upon some instrument. 
He answers not, or not to the purpose, and no 
marvel, for he is not at home. He scotcheth time 
with dancing with his mistress, taking up of her 
glove, and wearing her feather, he is confined to 
her colour, and dares not pass out of the circuit 
of her memory. His imagination is a fool, and it 
goeth in a pied coat of red and white. Shortly 
he is translated out of a man into folly; his 
imagination is the glass of lust, and himself 
the traitor to his own discretion. 7 
It does seem necessary, when discussing "An Amorist," 
to talk about people in life the same way Forster found it 
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necessary to talk about people in life, what he calls 
"flat" and "round" characters. We find that there is in 
his criticism a recognition that there is a grammatical 
character of a certain kind that can be called "flat" 
and that this ''flat" kind of character is different from 
a character that can be called "round." Although 
Forster's remarks about flat and round characters apply 
more directly to the discussion of the concrete universal 
(a discussion I keep dangling like a critical carrot~ 
$0me remarks will be useful here. 
Forster complains of Mrs. Micawber that Mrs. Micawber 
never says anything except that she will never desert 
Mr. Micawber. He complains about this instead of asserting 
it as a fact about a grammatical character, because he 
doesn't think that life presents us with such monomaniacs. 
The Amorist is grammatically monomaniacal. All of 
the sentences that contain "he" or "his" also contain some 
word about seduction, the same kind of linking talked about 
earlier with respect to Dorothea. There are, besides these 
recurrent links, several phrases that are either universals 
or are, by grammatical synecdoche, further limitations of 
the scope of the character. Of the first, the generaliza-
tions, there is "an amorist," "a man," and a "he" that 
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refers either to "an amorist" or to "a man," both universals. 
The second kind of phrase, a phrase that indicates a 
kind of synecdoche on the grammatical level occurs three 
times: (1) "His arms were carelessly used, as if their 
best~~ nothing but embracements;" (2) "He is 
untrussed, unbuttoned, and ungartered, not out of careless-
~· but care;" (3) He answers not, or not to the purpose, 
and no marvel, for he is not at home." With the negative 
phrases, two things are accomplished, some other possi-
bilities are posited, and he is denied them. He is con-
cretized into amorous language. 
It could be said that "An Amorist" is linked 
grammatically with "mistress" and "passion" because wolves 
in real life, as Boyce says, perfectly conform to one 
another. If we agree that some men are essentially wolfish 
that would not be information about the grammatical person. 
It might be useful now to look at a character type that is 
not so clearly what we would say is characteristic of 
some people, one of Nathalie Sarraute's Tropisms. 
He was smooth and flat, two level surfaces --
his cheeks which he presented first to one 
then to the other, and upon which, with their 
pursed lips, they pressed a kiss. 
They took him and they crunched him, turned 
him over and over, stamped on him, rolled, 
wallowed on him. They made him go round and 
round, there, and there, and there, they 
showed him disquieting painted scenery with 
blind doors and windows, towards which he 
walked credulously, and against which he 
bumped and hurt himself. 
They had always known how to possess him entirely, 
without a moment's respite, how to devour him to 
the last crumb. They surveyed him, cut him up 
into dreadful building blocks, into squares, 
traversed him in every direction; sometimes they 
let him run, turned him loose, but they brought 
him back as soon as he went too far, they took 
possession of him again. He had developed a 
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taste for this devouring in childhood --
he tendered himself, relished their bitter-
sweet odor, offered himself. 
The world in which they had enclosed him, in 
which they surrounded him on every side, was 
without issue. Everywhere their frightful 
clarity, their blinding light that levelled 
everything, did away with all shadows and 
asperities. 
They were aware of his liking their attacks, his 
weakness, so they had no scruples. 
They had emptied him entirely and restuffed 
him and they showed him everywhere other dolls, 
other puppets. He could not escape them. He 
could only turn politely towards them the two 
smooth surfaces of his cheeks, one after the other, 
for them to kiss.B 
Syntactically, one of the ways we understand that this 
character is a type is that the "he" refers only to "he," 
there is no proper name. The second clue is that "He was 
smooth and flat, two level surfaces." Early on in the 
sketch, "he" becomes "him," the object, while "they" 
becomes the subject. "They" acts on "him." The verb 
that is the syntactical relationship between "they" and 
"him" is, at first "took," then "crunched," then "turned 
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over." As we read syntactically building spatial character, 
we realize the "they" hurt the "him," so that when "him" 
becomes "he," it is not surprising that "he bumped and 
hurt himself," or that later "He could not escape them." 
Even as a subject, he cannot act at all or cannot act 
without being hurt. The relationship established, then, 
between"they" and "him" is that "they" controls and hurts 
"him." 
There is a new aspect of "he" added in the third 
paragraph; "He had developed a taste for this devouring 
in childhood -- he tendered himself, relished their 
bitter-sweet odor, offered himself." The new part is 
"had developed a taste for this devouring," but this new 
part is still within the framework of the relationship 
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with "they." "This devouring" is their devouring; of course, 
it is "their bitter-sweet odor." 
Both sketches, "An Amorist" and the tropism, end 
with lines that imply that "he" does not refer to "man." 
The first ends with "Shortly he is translated out of man 
into folly; his imagination is the glass of lust, and himself 
the traitor to his own discretion." The second ends with 
"and they showed him everywhere other dolls, other puppets." 
This second sketch, then, is a type for the same 
kinds of grammatical reasons "An Amorist" is a type. Can 
it be said that in either case "he" is a "type of actual 
person"? Of course the question "Is this a type of person?" 
is not a question about the grammatical characters, because 
words are not people. This is a question about the image 
and about what a reader is willing to say about life. One 
question that could be asked about the second sketch in 
order to determine its human type is: what would we title 
it? Would it be titled, among other possible titles, "A 
Twentieth-Century Man,'' "A Paranoid Man," "A Loser," 
"Hamlet"? 
The title of the sketch would depend upon what we are 
willing to say about people, and it would depend upon 
how we "saw" the character. I, for instance, would be 
willing to say that most people have felt manipulated, 
but that few people have enjoyed it. It seems to me, 
then, that an eerie, nameless individual is being 
described here. But if one could believe as George Luka~s 
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has that "modern ideology (denies) the individual," 9 and that 
part of this denial is a feeling of persecution, one could 
title this sketch "A Twentieth-Century Man." 
It seems, then, that there is a genre, the grammatical 
type, that depends on a reader's view of people and on 
his view of the character, rather than upon the grammatical 
character, for its typicality. If I can take the argument 
one step further, it would seem that if one would say that 
"he" in Saurraute's sketch is typical of a kind of 
person, the sketch itself would be what one would say 
about a kind of person. One could say, then, "The sketch 
speaks for me." It is then that the grammatical person 
would be what one would have said about a kind of person, 
but it cannot itself be a kind of person. 
The concrete universal, the fourth way of talking 
about the relationship between characters in books and 
people in life, is said to be a grammatical character that 
is at once individual and general. So far it has been 
suggested that there is a grammatical character that is on 
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the grammatical level, both individual and an example of 
some sort of generalization; Dorothea Brooks in Middlemarch 
was used as an example of this type of character. 
And it was seen that there is the grammatical type 
that might be considered universal if one were to agree 
that what is written is the essence of some people. 
The concrete universal seems to be a category that puts 
together the specific of "Dorothea" with the notion that 
"Dorothea," and her surrounding noun and verb clusters is 
what one would say is the essence of some people. 
This mingling seems clear in W. K. Wimsatt's definition 
of the concrete universal. 
A literary work of art is a complex of detail 
(an artifact, if we may be allowed that metaphor 
for what is only a verbal object), a composition 
so complicated of human values that its interpre-
tation is dictated by the understanding of it, 
and so complicated as to seem in the higheiO 
degree individual -- a concrete universal. 
His definition places "human values" inside a work of art, 
and a work is so full of these human values that the work's 
interpretation is dictated by the understanding of "it" and 
an understanding of it seems to be an understanding of human 
values. This seems to be quite like what I said earlier 
about grammatical types, that, as far as a reader agrees 
that what is written is the dominant trait of some people, 
the grammatical type can be said to be what one would say 
is a type of actual person. 
The characteristic that seems to distinguish the 
grammatical type from the concrete character for Wimsatt 
is the word "complicated." It was seen earlier that 
"An Amorist" is not complicated; grammatical type seems 
to center around one or two words. 
Falstaff or such a character of self-conscious 
'infinite variety' as Cleopatra are concrete 
universals because they have no class names, 
only their own proper ones, yet are structures 
of such precise variety and centrality that 
each demands a special interpretation in the 
realm of human values. 1 1 
It seems, then, that for Wimsatt, the concrete universal 
is the same thing as Forster's "round character." 
The notion that a grammatical character is both 
individual and universal could simply be another kind of 
type criticism where we could say, for instance, that 
Hamlet is a kind of person, perhaps a manic-depressive, 
where clearly the idea of his type is in our minds not in 
the play. It also seems possible, however, to say that 
some characters, even some very simple characters, are 
simultaneously individual and universal. "Julia," in 
Hericks's "Upon Julia's Clothes," is one character that 
might be a concrete universal in this sense. 
Whenas in silks my Julia goes, 
Then, then, methinks, how sweetly flows 
That liquefaction of her clothes. 
Next, when I cast mine eyes and see 
That brave vibration each way free, 
Oh, how that glittering taketh me!l2 
As a grammatical person, "Julia" is both "Julia" and "her 
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clothes." Julia and her clothes are individual in this 
poem because they do not extend beyond the limits of 
the poem "Upon Julia•s Clothes." In other words, they 
are concrete because they are grammatical character; they 
are only "themselves." But in this sense, too, the gram-
matical character type is also concrete and therefore 
individual. 
There is a way, though, that we can talk about a 
concrete universal. An individual proper name is one 
way of making a character both individual and universal. 
This simultaneity lies in our understanding of the name: 
The name of a human being designates him or her 
as both an individual and as a person; for this 
reason the name has male or female gender. But 
the first and second personal pronouns, which we 
use when addressing each other as persons have 
no gender. The third person pronoun has gender and 
is therefore, strictly speaking, impersonal. It is 
grammatically convenient, when speaking to say 
He or She, but if, when we do, we think of them 
as He or She, not as John and Sheila, then we are 
thinkinj of them, not as persons, but as indivi-
duals.1 
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It can be said that "Julia," the grammatical character, 
is, in the image, the woman who wore clothes in the poem 
"Upon Julia•s Clothes;" Julia is both "Julia" the person 
who, and "her," the woman who. There is no general state-
ment in the poem of which "Julia" is the example; "Julia" 
is a concrete who is, by the making of the mental recreation 
and the understanding of the language, a universal. 
The concrete universal is, as I suggested earlier, 
like, but not quite the same as, a virtue of a vice 
embodied. In a number of cases the difference is simply 
in a name. The Faerie Queene is a place in which to find 
several examples of virtues and vices embodied. 
And greedy Avarice by him d~d ride 
Upon a camel loaden all with gold; 
Two iron coffers hung on either side, 
With precious metal full as they might hold; 
And in his lap an heap of gold he told; 
For of his wicked pelf his god he made, 
And unto hell himself for money sold. 
Accure'd usury was all his trade, 
And right and wrong alike in equal balance weighed. 14 
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The name is "Avarice." "His lap" is the body; by rhetorical 
synecdoche "And right and wrong alike in equal balance 
weighed" is the syntactical mind. With the aid of the 
image, "him did ride" gives Avarice more body, as do 
"he told" and "his trade." All these phrases cluster 
around the name Avarice, a vice. This kind of monomaniac 
is a grammatical type. Because of the name "Avarice," 
he is called a vice embodied. If his name had been 
"Alfred," for instance, he would be called a grammatical 
type, a "flat character." But, he is also a concrete 
universal in the sense that he is a single uncopied grammati-
cal type, and in the sense that he, the image, acts as we 
would say an avaricious person would. 
It seems, then, that there are two basic relationships 
between characters and people in life. One is whether or 
not the grammatical character agrees with what we would 
say about people and the other is whether or not the 
image, the image in the sense of a character's point of 
view or actions or thoughts, agrees with what we would 
say about people. Of the first, we can say that a 
grammatical character type, because it is a character 
based upon only one or two concepts, is a grammatical 
character that is typical of some people if we agree with 
what is written. Percy Lubbock's discussion of Emma 
Bovary is an example of criticism based upon the image, 
because the criticism discusses Emma's point of view and 
replaces the grammatical person with the image as the 
fact of the character, but it is possible, as in the 
discussion of "On Julia's Clothes," to combine the two 
basic relationships in the "concrete universal," to say 
that although the grammatical character is unique, it is 
also typical of some people. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III 
l Gerald Else, Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 301. 
2 It is also possible to compare two grammatical 
characters and to compare two images. If we do this, we 
are doing either formalist criticism or new criticism. 
3Eliot, Middlemarch, pp. 156-157. 
4 W. K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the 
Meaning of Poetry (University of Kentucky Press, 1954), 
p. 76. 
5 Benjamin Boyce, The Polemic Character 1640-1661 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1955), p. 46. 
6 John Hollander and Frank Kermode, eds., The Litera-
ture £! Renaissance England (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1953), p. 1022. 
7
sir Thomas Overbury, "An Amorist," in The Literature 
of Renaissance England, eds., John Hollander and Frank Ker-
mode (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 1023. 
8Nathalie Sarraute, sketch number XIX, Tropisms, 
trans., Maria Jolas (New York: George Braziller, 1963), 
pp. 46-47. 
9 , . f . George Lukacs, The Mean1ng ~ Contemporary Real1sm 
(London: Merlin Press, 1962), p. 43. 
10 . 77 W1msatt, p. . 
ll . d . . l . W1msatt oes reJect s1mp y numer1cal arguments: 
"Yet it cannot be that the difference between the round 
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and flat character is simply numerical; the difference 
cannot be merely that the presiding principle is illustrated 
by more examples in the round character. Something further 
must be supposed -- a special interrelation in the traits of 
the round character" (p. 78). But, as the quote in the 
text shows, he still ends up with a numerical argument. 
12 b . k Ro ert Herrle , "Upon Julia's Clothes," in Hollander 
and Kermode, p. 617. 
13 W. H. Auden, Secondary Worlds (New York: Random 
House, 1968), p. 123. 
14 Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene, Bks. 
ed., Robert Kellogg and Oliver Steele (New York: 
Odyssey Press, 1965), p. 121. 
1 & 2, 
The 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
This paper was an attempt to describe what happens 
when we as readers compare literary characters with people. 
Literary character is a process that includes three separate 
elements: (1) syntactical character, the words that delimit 
character in the order in which they occur on the printed 
page; (2) spatial character, syntactical character patterned. 
These two elements together are called "grammatical charac-
ters"; (3) the image, a mental recreation of the syntactical 
and spatial characters. These elements can be isolated, 
but they are so intimately connected while we read that we 
are rarely conscious of their individual roles, and to 
further complicate the critical matter, we tend in our 
discussions of character to rely on the old relationship 
between characters and people. 
The isolation of these three elements, an isolation 
that seems important to discussions of character, becomes 
a confusing process when critics compare literary characters 
to people. E. M. Forster and Sir Philip Sidney, for 
instance, by calling characters "people in books" 1 and 
"images of virtues and vices," 2 make it difficult to dis-
tinguish between grammatical character and the image, 
making it difficult as well to discuss HCE from Finnegans 
Wake, Mrs. Malaprop, or an omniscient narrator. 
William Gass's reaction to these mimetic views is 
that character is "{1) a noise, (2) a proper name, {3) a 
complex system of ideas, (4) a controlling conception, 
{5) an instrument of verbal organization, 
mode of referring, ( 7) a source of verbal 
(6) a pretended 
3 
energy." 
Gass's objective view, which confines us to the grammatical 
character, makes discussions of characters like Emma 
Bovary or Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Ramsay dead and lifeless. 4 
The isolation of the three elements of character does 
not eliminate the relationship between characters in books 
and people; it just clarifies it. It is now possible to 
recognize that there are two distinct comparisons between 
character and people. We can compare the words we might 
say about people to the words with which a book presents 
character; they may be grammatically alike. And we can 
compare the image element of character with what we might 
imagine of people. The image, of course, is more directly 
related to what we make of people than is the grammatical 
character. This is easily seen in criticism -- Gass's 
criticism, which leaves out the image, is more dead and 
lifeless than Sidney's, which leaves in the image. But, 
as we have seen, it is confusing to make the book alive by 
saying in effect that what we imagine is the same sort of 
thing as what we say -- that characters are "people in 
books." Grammatical character is like what we would ~ 
so 
about people in life; the image is like what we would 
imagine about people. 
Finally from the separation of character into three 
elements and from the recognition that the grammatical 
character and the image approach in different ways a 
reader's perceptions of people, comes a clearer understand-
ing of the four different ways of comparing characters in 
books with what a reader is willing to say or to imagine 
that people are like. 
We can now say that characters compare with people 
in these four ways: (1) the grammatical character or the 
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image is like someone a reader knows. This is not precisely 
criticism, but impressionism; (2) a grammatical character 
is an example of some grammatical generalization about 
life; (3) a character is a type of person, which means that 
a grammatical character, usually a "flat character," is 
like what a reader would say is the dominant characteristic 
of some people. The image can also be used here to say 
things like "this character's attitude toward food is like 
some people's attitude toward food"; (4) a character is a 
concrete universal, which means that a character is 
simultaneously individual and typical of some people. 
This is the most complex of comparisons. Grammatical 
character is always individual; it is a unique set of 
words. If this set is "complicated" of several basic 
concepts, it can be considered to be like what a reader 
would say is typical of some people. And a grammatical 
character can be considered a concrete universal if its 
name is seen as simultaneously individual and general, 
since a name is both one's personal name and is indicative 
of sex and sometimes of class. The image can be used 
here too, to say, for example, that a character's change 
in attitude is like a change in attitude we have named 
from life. 
This criticism, then, a criticism based on the 
separation of our experiences of character into three 
separate elements, allows us to account for the traditional 
comparisons between characters and people, at the same 
time allowing us to discuss both the words and the images 
without confusing the two in a labyrinth of metaphors. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CONCLUSION 
1 47. Forster, p. 
2 . d Sl. ney, C3. 
3 36. Gass, p. 
4 He does suggest that there is a kind of spurious 
image: "from ~given body of fictional text, nothing 
necessarily follows, and anything may (p. 36). But it goes 
quickly, because images become, in his argument, simply 
free associative. 
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